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Abstract
A theoretical framework for grounding language is introduced that provides a computational path
from sensing and motor action to words and speech acts. The approach combines concepts from
semiotics and schema theory to develop a holistic approach to linguistic meaning. Schemas serve as
structured beliefs that are grounded in an agent’s physical environment through a causal-predictive
cycle of action and perception. Words and basic speech acts are interpreted in terms of grounded
schemas. The framework reflects lessons learned from implementations of several language process-
ing robots. It provides a basis for the analysis and design of situated, multimodal communication
systems that straddle symbolic and non-symbolic realms.
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1. Language and meaning
The relationship between words and the physical world, and consequently our ability to
use words to refer to entities in the world, provides the foundations for linguistic commu-
nication. Current approaches to the design of language processing systems are missing this
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will define in detail. A survey of contemporary textbooks on natural language processing
reveals a rich diversity of data structures and algorithms concerned solely with manipula-
tion of human-interpretable symbols (in either text or acoustic form) without any serious
effort to connect semantic representations to the physical world.
Is this a problem we should really care about? Web search engines and word processors
seem to work perfectly fine—why worry about distant connections between language and
the physical world? To see why, consider the problem of building natural language process-
ing systems which can in principled ways interpret the speaker’s meaning in the following
everyday scenarios:
An elderly woman asks her aide, “Please push that chair over to me”.
A man says to his waiter, “This coffee is cold!”.
A child asks her father, “What is that place we visited yesterday?”.
How might we build a robot that responds appropriately in place of the aide or waiter?
How might a web search engine be designed to handle the child’s query? These are of
course not questions that are typically considered part of natural language processing, but
these are basic questions that every human language user handles with deceiving ease. The
words in each of these examples refer to the physical world in very direct ways. The listener
cannot do the right thing unless he/she (it?) knows something about the particular physical
situation to which the words refer, and can assess the speaker’s reasons for choosing the
words as they have. A complete treatment of the meaning of these utterances—involving
both physical and social dynamics—is beyond the framework presented in this paper.
The focus here is on sub-symbolic representations and processes that connect symbolic
language to the physical world with the ultimate aim of modeling situated language use
demonstrated by these examples.
In recent years, several strands of research have emerged that begin to address the prob-
lem of connecting language to the world [4,6,12,15,21,22,29,44,51,56,58,62,69,70,74] (see
also the other papers in this volume). Our own efforts have led to several implemented
conversational robots and other situated language systems [25,60,61,63–65]. For example,
one of our robots is able to translate spoken language into actions for object manipulation
guided by visual and haptic perception [64]. Motivated by our previous implementations,
and building upon a rich body of schema theory [2,19,34,43,45,50,68] and semiotics [20,
42,47,49], I present a theoretical framework for language grounding that provides a com-
putational path from embodied, situated, sensory-motor primitives to words and speech
acts—from sensing and acting to symbols.
The gist of the framework is as follows. Agents translate between speech acts, percep-
tual acts, and motor acts. For example, an agent that sees a fly or hears the descriptive
speech act, “There is a fly here” is able to translate either observation into a common
representational form. Upon hearing the directive speech act, “Swat that fly!”, an agent
forms a mental representation that guides its sensory-motor planning mechanisms towards
the intended goal. Signs originate from patterns in the physical world which are sensed
and interpreted by agents to stand for entities (objects, properties, relations, actions, situa-
tions, and, in the case of certain speech acts, goals). Speech acts, constructed from lexical
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leads to two additional classes of signs which indicate, roughly, the “what” and “where”
information regarding an entity. To interpret signs, agents activate structured networks of
beliefs1 called schemas. Schemas are made of continuous and discrete elements that are
linked through six types of projections. Two of these projection types, sensor and action
projections, provide links between an agent’s internal representations and the external en-
vironment. These links are shaped by the specific physical embodiment of the agent. The
four remaining projection types are used for internal processes of attention, categorization,
inference, and prediction.
The primary focus of the framework in its current form is the interface between words
and physical environments, and how an agent can understand speech acts that are about the
environment. There are many important issues that are beyond the scope of this paper. I will
not address language generation, conceptual learning, language learning, or the semantics
of social or abstract domains. These topics are clearly of great importance, and will moti-
vate future work that takes the framework presented here as a starting point. Learning in
particular deserves further comment. I firmly believe that to scale grounded language sys-
tems, statistical machine learning will be required. Without appropriately structured biases
on what is learnable, however, the rich structures underlying situated language use will
be hopelessly out of reach of purely bottom-up data-driven learning systems. The frame-
work presented here may provide useful structural constraints for future machine learning
systems.
Taxonomic distinctions made in the theory are motivated by recurring distinctions that
have emerged in our implementations—distinctions which in turn were driven by practical
engineering concerns. Although the theory is incomplete and evolving, I believe it will be
of value to those interested in designing physically embedded natural language processing
systems. The theory may also be of value from a cognitive modeling perspective although
this is not the focus of the paper (see [62]).
Connecting language to the world is of both theoretical and practical interest. In practi-
cal terms, people routinely use language to talk about concrete stuff that machines cannot
make sense of because machines have no way to jointly represent words and stuff. We talk
about places we are trying to find, about the action and characters of video games, about the
weather, about the clothes we plan to buy, the music we like, and on and on. How can we
build machines that can converse about such everyday matters? From a theoretical perspec-
tive, I believe that language rests upon deep non-linguistic roots. Any attempt to represent
natural language semantics without proper consideration of these roots is fundamentally
limited.
1 Although this paper deals with topics generally referred to as knowledge representation in AI, my focus will
be on beliefs. From an agent’s point of view, all that exists are beliefs about the world marked with degrees of
certainty. Admittedly, as a robot designer, I share the intuition that a robot’s belief that x is true just in the cases
for which the corresponding situation x is the case—a correspondence that I as the designer can verify (Bickhard
calls this “designer semantics” [10]). True beliefs may be called knowledge in cases where the robot can in some
sense justify its belief. However, as a starting point I prefer to model beliefs rather than knowledge so that the
notion of correspondence can be explained rather than assumed.
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symbolic networks, non-linguistic knowledge is essential to ground basic terms of linguistic definitions.
Inherent to current natural language processing (NLP) systems is the practice of con-
structing representations of meaning that bottom out in symbolic descriptions of the world
as conceived by human designers. As a result, computers are trapped in sensory deprivation
tanks, cut off from direct contact with the physical world. Semantic networks, meaning pos-
tulates, and various representations encoded in first order predicate calculus all take objects
and relations as representational primitives that are assigned symbolic names. Without ad-
ditional means to unpack the meaning of symbols, the machine is caught in circular chains
of dictionary-like definitions such as those shown in Fig. 1 [27]. Efforts to encode knowl-
edge using symbolic forms which resemble natural language and that can be written down
by human “knowledge engineers” [37,40] are variations of this theme and suffer from the
same essential limitations. Dictionary definitions are meaningful to humans in spite of cir-
cularity because certain basic words (such as the words infants tend to learn first) hook into
non-linguistic experience and non-linguistic innate mental structures. How can we design
machines that do the same? To address this question, let us shift our attention to a very
different kind of machine intelligence: robot perception and control.
Consider the problem of designing a robot that avoids obstacles and navigates to light
sources in a room. Robot designers have learned that it is a bad idea to simply tell robots
where obstacles and lights are and expect the robot to work. This is because in practice,
with high probability, human mediated descriptions will not quite match the state of the
actual environment. No matter how accurately we draw a map and provide navigation in-
structions, the robot is still likely to fail if it cannot sense the world for itself and adapt
its actions accordingly. These are well known lessons of cybernetics and control theory.
Closed-loop control systems robustly achieve goals in the face of uncertain and changing
environments. Predictive control strategies are far more effective than reactive ones. In-
sights into a mathematical basis of teleology derived from developments in control theory
are every bit as relevant today as they were sixty years ago [59]. Cyclic interactions be-
tween robots and their environment, when well designed, enable a robot to learn, verify,
and use world knowledge to pursue goals. I believe we should extend this design philoso-
phy to the domain of language and intentional communication.
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knowledge representations that bottom out in symbolic, human generated descriptions of
the world. Language processing systems that rely on human mediated symbolic knowledge
have no way to verify knowledge, nor any principled way to map language to physical ref-
erents. An NLP system that is told what the world is like will fail for the same reasons as
robot do.
1.1. Language is embedded in the physical world
In everyday language, it is the rule rather than the exception that speech acts leverage
non-linguistic context to convey meaning. Barwise and Perry [8] call this the efficiency of
language—the same words can mean infinitely different things depending on the situation
of their use. In a variety of situated language applications, from spoken dialog systems for
cars to conversational interfaces for assistive robots, the relationship between language and
the physical world is a basis of efficient language use.
We might design ad hoc solutions for specific restricted applications, but I believe a
principled solution to address in-the-world language processing requires a basic rethink-
ing of how machines interpret words. The theory I develop is motivated by such concerns.
The framework has emerged through practice. Over the past several years, we have im-
plemented a series of systems which learn, generate, and understand simple subsets of
language connected to machine perception and action. These engineering activities have
been guided by the intuition that language needs to be connected to the real world much
the way that infants learn language by connecting words to real, visceral experience. What
has been lacking in our work, however, is a coherent way to describe and relate the various
systems, and provide a theoretical framework for comparing systems and designing new
ones. This paper is an attempt to address this latter concern. No attempt has been made to
prove that the theory is complete or correct in any formal sense given the early stages of
the work.
Although this paper is focused on systems with tight physical embeddings, the underly-
ing theoretical framework may be applied to communication tasks in which direct physical
grounding is not possible or desirable. My underlying assumption is that an approach which
is shaped primarily by concerns of physical grounding will lead to a richer and more ro-
bust general theory of semantics since intentional communication in humans presumably
evolved atop layers of sensory-motor control that were shaped by the nature of the physical
world.
1.2. Duality of meaning
Consider the coffee scenario, illustrated in Fig. 2. How does the speaker convey meaning
by uttering these words in this context? There seems to be a basic duality in the nature of
linguistic meaning. On one hand, the downward pointing arrow suggests that the speech
act conveys meaning by virtue of its “aboutness” relationship with the physical situation
shared by communication partners. On the other hand, we can interpret speech acts within
a larger theory of purposeful action taken by rational agents as indicated by the upwards
arrow.
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The everyday common usage of “meaning” also includes an additional sense, roughly
the emotional connotation of something (“My Father gave me that cup—it has great mean-
ing for me”). I believe connotative meanings of this kind are more complex and emerge
from more basic aspects of meaning, roughly as a summary statistic of an individual agent’s
goal-directed experiences. I will thus set aside connotations and focus the more basic as-
pects of meaning.
Referential meaning: Words are used to talk about (refer to) objects, properties, events,
and relations in the world
The sensory-motor associations of taste and temperature conjured by “coffee” and
“cold” rely on agents having similar embodied experiences caused by common underlying
aspects of reality (the chemical composition of coffee and the dynamics of heat transfer as
they interact with bodily actions and senses). Furthermore, the speech act in Fig. 2 is an
assertion about the state of a specific part of the world: “this” coffee. The word “coffee”
has meaning for the listener because, in part, it is directed towards a particular physical
object as jointly conceived by speaker and listener. The words “this” and “is” connect the
speech act to a region of space-time, in this case a part of the agents’ here-and-now.
Functional meaning: Agents use language to pursue goals
Speech acts can be considered within a broader theory of purposeful action [26]. Beyond
the literal meaning of “this coffee is cold” interpreted as an assertion about the state of the
world, in certain contexts the speaker may also intend an implied meaning to the effect of
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respect to the speaker’s intentions. For example, the speaker might have just been asked,
“Do you know if that coffee is hot or cold?”.
I believe that developing a computationally precise and tractable theory of language
use which simultaneously addresses both referential and functional meaning is a grand
challenge for the cognitive sciences. The framework presented here takes steps towards
addressing central aspects of this challenge, especially with regards to the referential na-
ture of words (but of course much more work remains to be done!). My approach will be
to identify essential aspects of communicative meaning that are required to build situated
systems with primitive linguistic abilities. Many details will necessarily be left out in order
to keep the whole in view with the intent of establishing a framework that can later be en-
riched and extended. This is indeed the spirit of Wittgenstein’s recommendation in dealing
with phenomena as complex as natural language [78]:
If we want to study the problems of truth and falsehood, of the agreement and disagree-
ment of propositions with reality, of the nature of assertion, assumption, and question,
we shall with great advantage look at primitive forms of language in which these forms
of thinking appear without the confusing background of highly complicated processes
of thought. When we look at such simple forms of language the mental mist which
seems to enshroud our ordinary use of language disappears. We see activities, reactions,
which are clear-cut and transparent. On the other hand we recognize in these simple
processes forms of language not separated by a break from our more complicated ones.
We see that we can build up the complicated forms from the primitive ones by gradually
adding new forms.
2. Grounding
The term grounding will be used to denote the processes by which an agent relates
beliefs to external physical objects. Agents use grounding processes to construct mod-
els of, predict, and react to, their external environment. Language grounding refers to
processes specialized for relating words and speech acts to a language user’s environment
via grounded beliefs. Thus, the grounding of language is taken to be derivative of the
grounding of beliefs. We can view the relationship between language, an agent’s beliefs,
and the physical world as illustrated in Fig. 3. Schemas are information structures held by
an agent that are modified by perceptual input and that guide action (details of the inter-
nal structure of schematized beliefs are provided in Sections 4–6). Interactions between
schemas and the environment are mediated by perception and motor action. Language use
is achieved through comprehension and production processes that operate upon schemas.
Fig. 3 is reminiscent of the classic semiotic triangle in which all mappings from words to
external objects are mediated by thoughts [47]. Thus, the framework developed here might
be called an approach to “computational semiotics” in which the interpretation of signs is
performed through schemas.
Agents use schemas to represent beliefs about their environment. Consider an agent that
is situated next to a table that supports a cup. For the agent to hold the grounded belief that
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that particular cup is on the table, two conditions must hold: (1) that cup must have caused
the belief via the natural physical laws of the universe (the flow of information via photons,
physical contact, sensory transduction, etc.), and (2) the belief must support predictions of
future outcomes regarding that cup conditioned on actions which the agent might take. On
this definition, the grounding process requires both causal and predictive relations between
referent and belief. This cyclic process corresponds to an interpretation-control loop that
must be implemented by an agent that holds grounded beliefs.
By virtue of being embedded in a shared physical world, the beliefs of agents are com-
pelled to alignment, providing the basis for coordinated action. Communication gets off
the ground because multiple agents can simultaneously hold beliefs grounded in common
external entities such as cups of coffee.
I take beliefs about the concrete, physical world of objects, properties, spatial relations,
and events to be primary. Agents can of course entertain more abstract beliefs, but these are
built upon a physically grounded foundation, connected perhaps by processes of analogy
and metaphor as suggested by the widespread use of physical metaphor in language [36].
An agent’s basic grounding cycle cannot require mediation by another agent. This re-
quirement excludes many interesting classes of agents that exist in purely virtual worlds.
This exclusion is purposeful since my goal is to develop a theory of physically grounded
semantics. If A tells B that there is a cup on the table, B’s belief about the cup is not
directly grounded. If B sees a cup on the table but then permanently loses access to the
situation (and can no longer verify the existence of the cup), then B’s belief is not di-
rectly grounded. I am not suggesting that an agent must ground all beliefs—that would
lead to a rather myopic agent that only knows about what it has directly experienced and
can directly verify. I am suggesting that in order to communicate with humans and build
higher order beliefs from that communication, an agent must have a subset of its beliefs
grounded in the real world without the mediation of other agents. From a practical point of
view, the necessity for real world unmediated grounding is well known to roboticists as we
discussed above. An autonomous robot simply cannot afford to have a human in the loop
interpreting sensory data on its behalf. Furthermore, complex inner representations must be
coupled efficiently, perhaps through layering, for operation under real-world uncertainty.
For autonomous robots to use language, we have no choice but to deal with internal repre-
sentations that facilitate conceiving of the world as objects with properties that participate
in events caused by agents. The need for unmediated grounding can also be argued from a
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ings of first words are learned in relation to the infant’s immediate environment. Language
is bootstrapped by non-linguistic experience and non-linguistic innate structures, paving
the way for comprehension of dictionary definitions and other sources of ungrounded be-
liefs. I return to this topic in Section 8.
It is worth heading off one possible criticism of the theory which may arise from a
misinterpretation of my definition of grounding. Although we have investigated language
learning in several systems (e.g., [60,61,63,66]), the focus of this paper is on represen-
tational issues and many of the implemented structures that this theory is based on have
not yet been learned by any fully automated system. We have instead used a pragmatic
approach in which some aspects of a representation (typically topological structure) are
designed manually, and machine learning is used to determine settings of parameters
only when standard statistical estimation algorithms are easily applicable. The potential
criticism arises from the fact that human designers are creating representations for the
machines—in essence, it might appear that we are describing the world for the machine—
precisely what I said I wanted to avoid. However, there is in fact no contradiction when
we consider the definition of grounding carefully. The definition places constraints on the
process by which a particular set of beliefs come to be, are verified, and maintained. The
definition does not make any demands on the source of the underlying design of represen-
tational elements. These might be evolved, designed, or discovered by the agent. In all of
our robotic implementations, the systems do indeed construct and maintain representations
autonomously, and link language to those belief structures.
2.1. Causal sensor grounding is not enough
Based on the definition of grounding I have stated, causality alone is not a sufficient
basis for grounding beliefs.2 Grounding also requires prediction of the future with respect
to the agent’s own actions. The requirement for a predictive representation is a signif-
icant departure from purely causal theories. For example, Harnad in his 1990 paper on
symbol grounding suggested a causal solution based on categorical perception of sensor-
grounded signals [27]. In my own past work [60,63] I have used “grounding” to describe
language systems with similar bottom-up sensory-grounded word definitions. The prob-
lem with ignoring the predictive part of the grounding cycle has sometimes been called
the “homunculus problem”. If perception is the act of projecting mental images into an
“inner mental theater”, who watches the theater?3 How do they represent what they see?
A “pictures in the head” theory without an accompanying theory of interpretation passes
the representational buck. The problem of interpretation is simply pushed one layer in-
wards, but leaves open the question of how those internal models have meaning for the
beholder. If the inner process constructs a model of the model, we are led to an infinite
regress of nested models which is of course unsatisfactory.
2 Sloman and Chappell also point out this limitation of purely bottom-up sensory grounding [71]. They discuss
the need for “symbol attachment” which is similar to the expanded definition of grounding developed in this
paper that encompasses perception and action.
3 Dennett calls this the Cartesian theater [17].
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about the immediate future) with respect to the agent’s own actions (where not acting at
all is considered a kind of action), we have a broad working definition of interpretation
that avoids descriptive regress. Beliefs have meaning for the agent because they have the
potential to predict future outcomes of the world, which the agent can verify for itself by
comparing predictions to actual sensations. As a result of this framing, beliefs that have
no possible impact on the agent’s abilities to make predictions about the outcomes of its
actions are deemed to have no value.4
3. Desiderata for a theory of language grounding
If a theory of language grounding is to provide the basis for agents to use physically
situated natural language, I suggest that it must satisfy three criteria:
(1) Unification of representational primitives: Objects, properties, events, and situations
should be constructed from the same set of underlying primitives. This requirement is
desirable if we are to have a way for beliefs about concrete objects and situations to be
efficiently translated into expectations with respect to actions (affordances).
(2) Cross-modal translatability: Information derived from perception and language should
be interpretable into a common representational form since we want to design agents
that can talk about what they observe and do.
(3) Integrated space of actions: Motor acts (e.g., leaning over to resolve a visual ambigu-
ity) and speech acts (e.g., asking a question to resolve a visual ambiguity—“is that a
cup or a can?”) should be expressed in a single integrated space of actions so that an
agent may plan jointly with speech and motor acts to pursue goals.
The framework that I will now present is motivated by these requirements. In Section 7
I will assess to what extent each goal has been satisfied.
4. A theory of signs, beliefs, projections, and schemas
The theoretical framework is a product of building systems and represents my attempt
to explicate the theoretical elements and structures that underlie these complex engineered
systems. Rather than separate the description of implementations, I will highlight relevant
implementations in the course of presenting the framework.
4.1. Signs
The structured nature of the physical world gives rise to patterns. A collection of data
elements (e.g., pixels) contains a pattern if the data has non-random structure (or equiva-
lently, is compressible, or is low in complexity) [18]. Patterns may be interpreted as signs
4 This is consistent with Peirce’s pragmatic approach to epistemology [48].
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if appropriately sensed and interpreted by an agent. I take Peirce’s definition of a sign as a
starting point [49]:
A sign . . . is something which stands to somebody for something in some respect or
capacity.
I will interpret Peirce’s definition in the following way. A sign is a physical pattern
(first instance of “something” in Peirce’s definition) which only exists as a sign relative to
an interpreter (“somebody”). A sign signifies an object, some entity in the world (second
instance of “something”). Signs may take other signs as their objects, leading to nesting of
signs. For example, a shadow might be a sign of a cloud. If the shadow leads to a cooler
patch of ground, the temperature of the ground serves as a sign for both the shadow, and
chains through to serve as a sign of the cloud. This does not necessarily mean that an
interpreter can make the connection from a sign to its object, only that the physical causal
link exists. Signs signify (stand for) only limited aspects of their objects (“some respect or
capacity”) and thus can serve to abstract and reduce information.
4.2. Three classes of signs: Natural, indexical, intentional
Signs may be classified as natural, intentional, and indexical.5 This classification
scheme is not mutually exclusive—a physical pattern may be interpreted as both a natural
and an indexical sign. Natural signs are shaped by nomic physical laws (natural flow of
photons, pull of gravity, etc.) whereas intentional signs are generated by volitional agents
for some purpose. The configuration of photons signifying the fly is a natural sign. The
speech act, “there’s a fly!”, is an intentional sign. Of course the surface form of the words
exist as a physical pattern of vibrating air molecules, as much a part of the sensible world
as photons, but their origins are fundamentally different. The word “fly” signifies the fly
by convention and is uttered by a rational agent with some purpose in mind.
Indexical signs situate beliefs relative to a spatiotemporal frame of reference. The loca-
tion of the fly within an agent’s field of view may lead to an indexical sign of its spatial
position relative to the viewer’s frame of reference. The semantics of indexical signs arise
from their use as parameters for control. As we shall see, an indexical belief that specifies
the spatial location of an object may serve as a control parameter in a robot to control
reaching and visual saccade behaviors directed towards a target. An alternative approach
would be to treat the spatiotemporal location of an object as simply another property of
the object like its color or weight. We have found, however, that in construction of robotic
systems, separation of spatiotemporal information leads to cleaner conceptual designs.6
5 This classification scheme is related to Peirce’s three-way classification of iconic, indexical, and symbolic
signs. However, I prefer Ruth Millikan’s distinction between natural and intentional signs [42] for reasons I
explain in the text.
6 For example, in order to debug machine vision systems, spatial coordinate frames are very useful from a
designer’s perspective. When designing structured motor control algorithms, conceptualizing action sequences
over time is equally useful. Whether at a formal level these distinctions might be dropped altogether is unclear.
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objects via natural signs. Indexicals will then be folded in, leading to spatiotemporally sit-
uated beliefs about objects. Finally, we will consider the comprehension and generation of
intentional signs (grounded speech acts).
4.3. Analog signs
Sensors transduce physical patterns from the environment into analog, continuously
varying signs (for robots, encoded as electrical potentials) which the agent can further
transform, interpret, store, and use to guide actions. The only way for signs to enter an
agent from the environment is through sensors. The embodiment of an agent determines
its sensors and thus directly affects the signs which an agent can pick up.
The agent is attuned to specific channels of sensory input and only detects signs that
appear within those channels. For example, an agent can be attuned to high contrast closed
forms that are picked out from a visual environment, localized high intensity impulses from
a haptic environment, or speech signals from an acoustic environment while ignoring other
signs from those same channels. Attunement may be innate and unalterable, or determined
by the agent’s state of attention. Multiple channels can be derived from a single sensor
(e.g., color and shape are different input channels, both of which might be derived from
the same camera). On the other hand, multiple sensors can contribute to a single input
channel.7
A sensor-derived channel defines a continuous space which I will call the channel’s
domain. Patterns project into domains via sensors. When a pattern is detected within a
channel to which the agent is attuned, the detected pattern is called an analog sign.
To take a simple example, imagine a robot with camera input that uses an optical re-
gion detector based on background/foreground contrast properties to detect closed visual
regions (sensed patterns corresponding perhaps to external objects). The robot is designed
to measure two features of the region, its maximum height and width. Presented with an
object, an analog sign of the object is thus a pair of continuously varying magnitudes, h
and w. The range of possible values of h and w, and thus the domain of incoming signs for
this channel, range from 0 to H and 0 to W , the height and width of the robot’s visual field
(measured in pixels). An observed analog sign is a particular pair of (h, w) values resulting
from an external stimulus.
4.4. Analog beliefs
Analog signs are causally tied to the immediate environment. Their indexicality is in-
herently limited to the here-and-now. Beliefs, on the other hand, are persistent information
structures that “stretch” indexicality over space and time. An analog belief is a distribu-
tion over all possible observations within a continuous domain. Analog beliefs map analog
signs to scalar magnitudes. An analog belief can serve as both an element of memory which
7 The superior colliculus of cats contain neurons which only fire under the conditions of simultaneous auditory,
visual, and somatosensory evidence [75]. This is an example in nature of multiple sensors leading to a single
channel of input.
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what will be observed within a channel. To be useful in practice, analog beliefs must be
context-dependent. As we shall see, context is defined by the structure of schemas within
which beliefs are embedded.
Returning to the earlier robot vision example, an analog belief for the shape input chan-
nel can be implemented as a probability density function defined over the two-dimensional
H × W domain. One or more analog sign observations may be summarized as an analog
belief, forming the basis for memory.
To recap, analog beliefs are continuous distributions that are about signs since they are
defined with respect to domains inhabited by signs. Natural signs, in turn, are about as-
pects of their objects by definition—they are causally connected to their objects due to
nomic physical conditions of the environment. Due to the nested relationship between be-
liefs, signs, and objects, analog beliefs are about objects. Analog beliefs form elements of
schemas which enable an agent to both encode causal histories of signs and make context-
dependent predictions about the observation of new signs, satisfying the causal-predictive
grounding cycle defined in Section 2.
4.5. Sensor projections
I now introduce a graphical notation of typed nodes and typed edges that I will use
to represent schemas. Fig. 4 shows the notation for analog beliefs as ovals. Analog be-
liefs may have names (“A” in Fig. 4) for notational convenience only. The names are not
accessible to the agent. The meaning of an analog belief from the agent’s perspective is de-
rived strictly from its function in guiding the agent’s interpretative, predictive, and control
processes. Fig. 4 also introduces a representation of the sensory transduction and observa-
tion process as a projection. I will define five more projections as we proceed.
4.6. Schema types and tokens
Fig. 4 is our first example of a schema, a structured network of beliefs connected by
projections. We will encounter a series of schema diagrams of this kind as we proceed.
The purpose of these diagrams is to show how elements of the theory are combined to
implement various functions such as active sensing, representation of actions and objects,
and higher level situational, goal, and linguistic structures. Agents maintain schema types
in a long term memory schema store. An agent interprets its environment by instantiating,
modifying, and destroying schema tokens which are instances of structures such as Fig. 4.
For example, if an agent is attuned to an input channel represented by the sensor projection
in Fig. 4, then an observation in this channel may be interpreted by instantiating a token
of the schema, resulting in an instantiation of an analog belief. The decision of whether to
Fig. 4. Graphical notation for a sensor projection connected to an analog belief.
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actually instantiate a schema depends on the control strategy employed by the agent. The
structure of possible interpretations of an observation are determined by the contents of the
agent’s schema store. The contents of the store might be innate, designed, learned, or some
combination thereof.
4.7. Transformer projections
A second type of projection is called a transformer. A transformer performs a mapping
from one analog domain to another. Transformers may be used to pick out features of
interest from one analog belief to project a new analog belief, or might be used to combine
multiple analog beliefs. An observation from a source domain may be transformed into an
observation in a target domain by a transformer. For example, an observation of a shape
represented by h and w may be transformed into a one-dimensional domain by taking the
product of the terms. In this case, the transformer is simply an analog multiplier. An agent
might want to make this transformation in order to ground words such as “large” which
depend on surface area. A division transformer (i.e., one that computes the ratio w/h)
could be used to ground words which depend on visual aspect ratios such as “long” (for
an implementation along these lines, see [61]). The graphical notation for transformers is
shown in Fig. 5.
4.8. Categorizer projections
The need for categorization is directly motivated by the discrete nature of language.
Words (or morphemes) are discrete categorical labels. For an agent to use words that refer
to the physical world it must have the capacity to discretely categorize continuously varying
representations according to linguistic convention.
Categorizer projections map analog domains onto discrete domains via pattern catego-
rization. Analog signs are projected into a categorical signs. The mapping is many to one.
Information about differences between a pair of analog signs is lost if the signs happen
to map into the same categorical sign. Categorization provides a mechanism for express-
ing functional equivalence. Assuming a well-designed agent, categorization provides the
means of establishing kinds of signs that signify the same information to the agent irre-
spective of detectable variations in the signs’ analog domains.
Let us return one last time to our example of shape representation via two-dimensional
height and width features. The analog domain may be discretized by creating a pair of ana-
log beliefs defined over the domain that are set into competition with each other. A decision
boundary is defined by the points at which the analog beliefs are of equal magnitude. This
process divides the domain into two categories.
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tive means. Discriminative classifiers (e.g., multilayered perceptrons) explicitly model the
boundaries between categories defined with respect to a fixed input feature space. Gener-
ative classifiers capture the variability in data in general, for instance by modeling proto-
typical members of categories, also with respect to a fixed input feature space. Category
boundaries emerge due to competition between prototypes, or by applying thresholds to
prototypes. All of the systems we have implemented to date rely on prototypes to establish
categorical boundaries.
4.9. Categorical beliefs
The second elementary form of belief is a categorical belief, which is a belief about the
output of a categorization process which maps an analog domain to a discrete domain. Cat-
egorization is performed by categorizer projections. The output domain of a categorizer is
always a finite discrete set of outcomes. A categorical belief is thus a discrete distribution
(typically a discrete probability distribution in our implementations). In contrast to ana-
log beliefs, categorical beliefs rely on categorization—they may be thought of as beliefs
about answers to verbal questions one might ask about analog observations (e.g., will the
brightness of this patch of pixels will be greater than 0.5? Is this shape a square?). Fig. 6
introduces notation for categorizer projections and categorical beliefs.
In cases where all belief is concentrated on a single discrete outcome, the specific out-
come can be given a lowercase label and shown explicitly in the graphical notation as
illustrated in Fig. 7. The interpretation of this diagram is that the agent believes (remem-
bers, predicts) that the outcome of the categorizer will with high likelihood be the indicated
value. Residual belief in other outcomes might be maintained—the notation simply makes
the information structure clear for purposes of conceptual design and analysis.
4.10. Action projections
The specific physical embodiment of an agent gives rise to a natural set of action
primitives. For example, the robots we have constructed [52,60,63] have separate servo
Fig. 6. Graphical notation for a categorizer projection which maps a source analog belief, A, to a target categorical
belief, D.
Fig. 7. Graphical notation for a categorizer projection which maps a source analog belief, A, to a target cate-
gorical belief with concentrated belief in a single outcome. The label of this outcome (“square”) is a notational
convenience and is unavailable to the agent.
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motors dedicated to each degree-of-freedom (DOF) of the robot. Using standard position-
derivative control, each motor is associated with a lowest-level action primitive, essentially
“move to position x along a specified spatiotemporal path” subject to failure conditions due
to unanticipated collisions or other external conditions which require reactive response.
When an agent attempts to execute a primitive action, it either succeeds or fails.
Actions provide a new representational element, an action projection, which results in
a discrete binary (success/fail) outcome identical in form to the output of categorizer pro-
jections. This can be seen in the graphical notation for action projections indicated by
diamonds in Fig. 8. Actions lead to categorical signs that are represented as categorical
beliefs, either indicated as distributions over binary outcomes (left-most figure) or alterna-
tively, specific beliefs about the success or failure of an action (for notational convenience,
I write “success” rather than “D = success”).
The use of a categorical belief to represent the outcome of an action binds actions into
the theory of signs at a most basic level. Each time the agent executes an action primitive,
the result is a categorical sign about the world it has acted upon. Action and sensing are
thereby intimately intertwined.
4.11. Active perception, perceptive action
Success or failure provides only limited information about an action. In general an agent
may want information about the manner in which an action succeeds or fails. An agent can
achieve this through active sensing—sensing analog signs while an action is performed.
An example of this arose from experiments with one of our robots, Ripley [52,64], which I
now briefly introduce. Only details relevant to the development of the theory are mentioned
here. More technical descriptions of the robot may be found in previous papers.
Ripley, pictured in Fig. 9, is a manipulator robot that was designed for grounded lan-
guage experiments. Its seven degrees of freedom are driven by back-drivable, compliant
actuators instrumented with position and force sensors, providing the robot with a sense of
proprioception. Two miniature video cameras are placed at the gripper which also serves
as the robot’s head (when the robot talks with people, it is hard-coded to look up and
“make eye contact”, to make spoken interaction more natural). Ripley’s gripper fingers are
instrumented with force-resistive sensors giving it a sense of touch.
The visual system of the robot includes several low-level image processing routines
for segmenting foreground objects from the background based on color, finding closed
form connected visual regions, and extracting basic shape and color features from regions.
A higher level visual sub-system tracks regions over time and maintains correspondence
between regions as the robot’s perspective shifts. When a region is detected and tracked
over time, an object is instantiated in Ripley’s mental model. The mental model provides
Ripley with object permanence. Ripley can look away from the table (such that all the
objects on the table are out of sight), and when it looks back to the table, Ripley retains
186 D. Roy / Artificial Intelligence 167 (2005) 170–205Fig. 9. Ripley is a 7 DOF manipulator robot terminating in a gripper, pictured here handing an apple to its human
partner. The human speaks into a head-worn microphone to communicate with the robot. Two video cameras and
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providing proprioceptive sensing.
correspondences between objects from before. If a human intervenes and adds, removes,
or moves physical objects, Ripley instantiates, destroys, and updates objects in its mental
model. Each object in the mental model encodes basic visual attributes of the object (shape,
color) and object locations encoded with respect to Ripley’s body configuration (we will
return to this last point in the discussion on indexical signs in Section 4.12). Ripley’s visual
system also includes a face tracker to locate the position of its human communication
partner. It is able to use this information to modulate spatial language to distinguish, for
example, “the cup on my right” from “the cup on your right” [64].
The robot’s work space consists of a round table. The robot’s motor control system
allows it to move around above the table and view the contents of the table from a range
of visual perspectives. A visually-servoed procedure lets the robot move its gripper to the
centroid of visual regions. Several other motion routines enable the robot to retract to a
home position, to lift objects from the table, and to drop them back onto the table.
Ripley understands a limited set of spoken requests. Output from a speech recognizer is
processed by a spatial language interpreter [25] which maps requests onto goals with re-
spect to objects in Ripley’s mental model. A limited look-ahead planner chooses actions to
satisfy goals such as looking at, touching, grasping, lifting, weighing, and moving objects.
We are now ready to consider how Ripley might represent the meaning underlying
words such as “soft” or “hard” used in their most literal, physical sense. An obvious ap-
proach, one that we implemented, is to sense the degree of resistance which is met in the
course of gripping. The resistance reading indicates the compliance of the object, providing
the basis for grounding words that describe these properties.
Fig. 10 shows how to combine some of the elements introduced earlier into a schema
to represent active perception required for touching to gauge compliance, providing the
basis for grounding words such as “soft” and “hard”. The schema may be interpreted as
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follows. The action primitive closeGrip, when executed, runs a motor controller connected
to the grip motor. The gripper may or may not reach the targeted position (if the robot
successfully grasps a large rigid object, the object will block the gripper from closing).
The outcome of the action is represented by the categorical belief D. A sensor projection,
senseGripResistance, is connected to D and projects an analog belief with the designer-
friendly (but invisible to agent!) annotation COMPLIANCE. The connection from D to
the projection is interpreted to mean: run senseGripResistance while the source action
connected to D is executed.
4.12. Indexical signs and schema parameters
Indexical signs signify spatiotemporal locations—regions of space-time. These signs
give rise to beliefs about locations, which in turn provide the grounding for language about
space and time. I will use the Ripley implementation once again as an example of how
belief structures can be constructed about locations, and then generalize the idea to develop
the theoretical framework.
To represent a belief about spatial location, consider how Ripley perceives indexical
signs of objects such as cups. For Ripley to move its gripper to touch a cup, it must set
six joint angles appropriately (the seventh joint is the gripper open-close angle). When
Ripley touches an object, the six-dimensional joint configuration at the moment of con-
tact provides an encoding of the object’s location. Similarly, when Ripley looks around
the table and detects that same object, again its six joint angles encode position when
combined with the two-dimensional coordinates of the object’s visual region within Rip-
ley’s visual field, leading to an eight-dimensional representation of space. To connect these
two representations of spatial location, we implemented a coordinate translation algorithm
using principles of forward kinematics and optical projection combined with knowledge
of Ripley’s physical embodiment. All object positions, regardless of which modality de-
tected them, are transformed into a two-dimensional space corresponding to positions on
the surface of the robot’s work surface. As currently implemented, the location of an ob-
ject is represented deterministically. However, similar to Isla and Blumberg [30], we plan
to extend the implementation to support probabilistic representation of spatial location by
assigning a distribution over possible two-dimensional positions.
When an object is detected by Ripley through touch, the configuration of the robot’s
body provides a six-dimensional value which is an observation of the indexical sign orig-
inating from the physical object. We can consider body pose to be an input channel, and
the proprioceptive sensor reading to be an observation of an indexical sign. The domain of
the input channel spans Ripley’s permissible body poses. A transformer projection maps
indexical observations into a two-dimensional domain, which can be transformed again to
guide grasping or visual targeting.
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using the same forms of representation: analog beliefs and categorical beliefs. Indexical
analog beliefs are distributions over possible locations within a continuous spatiotem-
poral domain. Indexical categorical beliefs are distributions over discrete spatiotemporal
categories. Categorical beliefs can be used to represent relative temporal and spatial rela-
tionships such as Allen’s temporal relations [1] or topological spatial relations [55].
Consider now a search routine used by Ripley called detectHandContact that requires a
parameter L, an analog belief defined over a location domain that the robot can map into
arm positions. The routine detectHandContact(L) is not an action primitive, but instead
implements an iterative search procedure in which the peak value in L is used to select
where to reach, and if no hand contact is detected, the region of L around that peak is set
to 0, and the next highest peak in L is tried.
The same analog belief that guides the hand control routine can also be used to drive a
visual routine, detectVisualRegion(L) which performs a similar visual search through the
control of visual saccades. As we shall see in Section 5, the use of a shared indexical analog
belief as the control parameter for multimodal action routines provides a basis for deriving
a sensory-motor grounded semantics of spatial location which can be extended to represent
location in space and time.
4.13. Complex actions and abstraction
Building on the idea of parameterized actions, we can now construct structured schemas
representing complex actions which will provide the basis for grounding concrete action
verbs. The top schema in Fig. 11 gives an example of a schema for lifting. Examining
the schema from left to right, when interpreted as a control procedure, to lift means to
search and find the object (using the parameter L1 to guide the haptic search), close the
gripper, query the gripper touch sensors, make sure a stable grip is found, and then to
move the gripper to a new location specified by the peak value of another analog belief
parameter, L2. The same schema can be denoted by an abstracted schema (bottom) which
shows a single action projection that carries the designer-friendly label lift and its two
indexical analog belief parameters, the source and destination locations. Note that other
implementations of lifting which differ from the top schema, but which take the same
input parameters and lead to the same change in situations can be represented by the single
schema at bottom. The abstraction process suppresses “by means of” details and retains
only the parametric form of the whole.
Fig. 11. Top: Schema for lift; L1 specifies a distribution over possible start locations and L2 specifies a distribu-
tion over the target completion locations. Bottom: Abstracted representation of the same schema.
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Consider what effects, which might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive
the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole
of our conception of the object. (Charles Sanders Peirce, 1878.)
We are now able to construct schemas for physical objects using a combination of nat-
ural analog beliefs, natural categorical beliefs, indexical analog beliefs, sensor projections,
categorizer projections, and action projections. We have already seen some examples of
schemas for properties (Fig. 10) and complex actions (Fig. 11). Object schemas subsume
action and property schemas. This is in contrast to many previous computational interpre-
tations of schema theory (e.g., [67,68]) which take objects as representational primitives
distinct from the actions that act upon them. I believe that for an agent to efficiently gener-
ate affordances8 of novel situations for dynamically changing goals on the fly, a practical
option is to represent objects, actions, and goals with a common set of lower level primi-
tives.
My approach to the construction of objects from sensory-motor grounded primitives
is consistent with Drescher’s approach [19]. Drescher’s schema mechanism represents an
object as a set of expected interactions with the environment. Drescher, however, chose not
to allow parameterization and other structuring elements to enter his framework, which led
to difficulties in scaling the representation to higher order concepts of the kind I seek to
address. Smith’s conception of the “intentional dance” [72] has also directly influenced my
approach to object perception and conception as a dynamic, constructive process.
Fig. 12 illustrates a schema for a palpable visible object such as a cup.9 A functionally
equivalent structure has been implemented in Ripley as the object permanence part of the
robot’s mental model which coordinates visual perception, motor control for grasping, and
referent binding for speech based understanding of directives [64].
Let us walk through the main paths of this schema to see how it works. The handle of
this schema is the categorical belief labeled O = cup. Symbolic names (e.g., “cup”) will be
attached to handles of schema types. The domain of O is a discrete set of possible objects
known to the agent.10 The label O = cup indicates that this schema encodes beliefs that are
held in the case for which belief within the domain of O is concentrated on the outcome
cup. As with all labels, these are provided for us to design and analyze schemas. From the
agent’s perspective, O is simply a categorical belief which derives its semantics from its
relations to other elements of the schema.
Two action projections connect to the schema handle O . Following first the top
action projection, detectVisualRegion(L) projects a binary accomplishment categori-
8 Affordances is used here as defined by J.J. Gibson to be a function of both the external real situation and the
goals and abilities of the agent [23].
9 Arbib, Iberall, and Lyons have also suggested detailed schemas for multimodal integration of vision and grasp-
ing of objects such as cup [3], but their choice of representational elements do not lead to a semiotic interpretation
as I seek in here.
10 Of course the agent may be able to learn new categories of objects and thus increase the span of the domain
over time.
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cal belief. Two sensor projections emanate from this categorical belief. The first,
senseRegionLocation feeds back the actual location at which a visual region is found to
update L. An agent can execute this path, for instance, to actively track the location of an
object. The senseRegion sensor is attuned to the output of detectVisualRegion and projects
R, an analog belief with a domain over possible region geometries. Two transformers
project (extract) analog color and shape information about R onto separate analog beliefs.
A categorizer projects the shape analog belief onto a specific shape category outcome, s1
which corresponds to the shape of cups (if the distribution of belief in O was concentrated
on a different object type, say balls, then the distribution over the SHAPE categorical belief
would shift as well). To specify a cup of a particular color, the distribution of belief would
simply be shifted accordingly in the COLOR analog belief.
The lower pathway of the schema may look familiar—it is an embedding of the lift
schema that we have already seen (Fig. 11). Two feedback loops are used to update L based
on haptic sensation using the senseHandLocation sensory projection. The indexical L can
serve as a coordinator between modalities. In Ripley, for example, we have implemented a
coarse-grained vision-servoed grasping routine which relies on the fact that a single spatial
indexical coherently binds the expected success locations for vision and touch.
The object schema is an organizing structure which encodes various causal dependen-
cies between different actions that the agent can take and expectations of sensory feedback
given that a cup actually exists at L. To believe that a cup is at L, the agent would be
committed to the expectations encoded in this schema. If the agent executed some of the
action projections of the schema and encountered a failure categorical belief, this would
provide cause for the agent to decrease its belief that O = cup. Conversely, if the agent is
unaware of the presence of a cup, it may inadvertently discover evidence which leads it to
instantiate this schema and thus develop a new belief that there is a cup at L.
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network are instructions for multimodal active perception and manipulation directed to-
wards the object. Given a goal with respect to the object (e.g., finding out what its color is,
or moving it to a new location), the schema provides predictions of sequences of actions
which will obtain the desired results.
A central aspect of the concept of a cup, that its function is to carry stuff, is not yet
captured in this schema. To represent this, containment of objects relative to other objects
must be represented (Section 5.3).
5.1. Construction of objects: Individuation and tracking
To perceive an object, the agent must instantiate a schema token that stands for that
object. A particular internal information structure within the agent serves as an “absorber”
for signs from the environment which the agent attributes to an individual object. It is by
virtue of maintaining a particular mental absorber over time that the agent conceptualizes
individuals over time. These internal structures stand for entities in the world and provide
the agent with a basis for grounding names and categorical labels that refer to the entities.
Partial evidence may cause an agent to instantiate a complex schema token that makes
various predictions about possible interactions with the object. The schema is grounded
in the actual object because (1) physical signs caused by the object are transduced by
the agent and interpreted into schemas, and (2) these schemas in turn generate a cluster
of expectations of future interactions with the object as observed through future signs.
Of course an agent might make mistakes in the process of interpreting partial evidence,
leading to representational errors. Further interaction with the environment may then lead
the agent to revise its beliefs.
5.2. Ambiguity and error in interpretation
A sign may give rise to multiple possible interpretations. For instance, any tangible
object may be placed within an agent’s path leading to physical contact. The resulting
unanticipated categorical belief (from, say, detectHandContact) might have been caused
by any physical object, not just a cup. Prior context-dependent beliefs encoded as a distri-
bution over O play an important role in such cases. If the agent has an a priori basis for
limiting expectations to a reduced set of objects, then ambiguity is reduced at the outset. If
an agent knows it is indoors, the priors on things usually found outdoors can be reduced.
Regardless of how low the entropy of an agent’s priors may be, sensory aliasing is a fact
of life. A circular visual region impinging on an agent’s retina might signal the presence
of a ball, a can viewed from above, a flat disc, and so forth. In response, the agent might
instantiate multiple schema tokens, one for each significantly likely interpretation.
An agent may misinterpret signs in two ways. First, if the agent detects a novel object
for which it has not matching schema type, it will be impossible for it to instantiate an
appropriate schema in response to signs of the objects. If the potential number of schemas
is too large, a pragmatic approach for the agent might be to instantiate a likely subset,
which can be revised on the basis of future observations. Error may enter in the process of
deciding on the likely subset. For example, if a robot detects a visual sign of a distant visual
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probabilities on what objects are expected at that time and place, the robot can instantiate
only the most likely subset of schemas. However if the priors do not match that particular
context, none of the instantiated schemas will predict future interactions with the object,
and thus the interpretation is in error.
If the agent needs to disambiguate the type of object that caused the ambiguous sign,
its course of action lies within the schemas. The instantiated alternative schemas are rep-
resented in terms of expected outcomes of actions, and so the agent can choose to execute
actions which predict maximally different outcomes for different object classes. For the
disc-ball-can problem, simply leaning over to obtain a view from a side perspective will
suffice.
5.3. Situation schemas
A situation is represented by linking schemas via their indexical elements. Fig. 13 shows
the schema corresponding to “There is a cup here. Something is touching the cup”. Only
the handle categorical beliefs of the objects O1 and O2 are shown, along with their as-
sociated indexical analog beliefs L1 and L2. I use the notational shortcut of the at link
to summarize object schemas by their handles and associated indexical analog belief. No
expected outcome of O2 is specified, indicating a high entropy belief state with respect to
O2’s type. A pair of categorizers projects beliefs about spatial relationships between L1
and L2, and between L1 and L0. The projected categorical belief labeled contact serves
as a situational constraint and encodes the belief that a contact relationship exists between
L1 and L2.
L0 is a default spatial indexical analog belief corresponding to “here”. L0’s domain
spans the default spatial operating range of the agent which depends on the agent’s em-
bodiment. A second spatial relation categorical belief encodes the belief that the cup is
contained within L0. For Ripley, L0 is the surface of a table in front of Ripley which is the
only area that Ripley is able to reach.
To represent “the ball is in the cup”, the situational constraint between L1 and L2 is
changed to contain(L1,L2), a topological spatial relation. To reason about embedded in-
dexical relationships during goal pursuit, relational constraints must be taken into account.
For example, if the agent wishes to find the ball but can only see the cup, belief in a
containment or contact relationship between the ball’s indexical analog belief and the cup’s
Fig. 13. The situation corresponding to, “There is a cup here. Something is touching the cup.”
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the cup.
Clearly there is much more to be modeled with regards to spatial relations. The com-
plexities of spatial terms such as “in” are well researched [28] and very detailed geometric
models are required to capture spatial relations that depend not only relation locations of
objects, but also their orientations and specific shapes [56,57]. Beyond modeling geometry,
functional criteria also play a crucial role [16]. For example, an apple that is at the top of
a heaping bowl of fruit is still said to be “in” the bowl, even though it is not geometrically
contained by the bowl, because the bowl affords control over the location of the apple (if
the bowl is moved, so is the apple). A promising future direction is to model the interaction
of functional and geometric factors (see [11] for preliminary steps). For example, a mobile
robot could ground its understanding of “in the corner” in terms of how the corner restricts
the robot’s potential motion. Such an approach would introduce constraints from motor
control to ground spatial language.
5.4. Negation, disjunction, and explicit representations
Certain forms of negation are handled naturally in the proposed framework, others are
more problematic. In Ripley’s world, some objects can be seen but not touched because
they are flat (e.g., photographs). The distinction between tangible visible objects and in-
tangible yet visible objects is handled by replacing the success categorical belief projected
by detectHandContact (L) in Fig. 12 with fail, and by removing all outgoing edges from
that categorical belief. In effect, the schema encodes the belief that the two kinds of ob-
jects are identical except that for photographs, the haptic pathway is expected to fail. The
intangible object’s indexical analog belief L is refreshable only through visual verification.
Difficult cases for handling negation arise from possible world semantics. For example,
we might want to tell an agent that “there are no cups here”. This sort of negative de-
scription is unnatural to represent in the approach I have outlined since the agent explicitly
instantiates structures to stand for what it believes to be the case. The representation might
be augmented with other forms of belief, perhaps explicit lists of constraints based on nega-
tions and disjunctions which are compared against explicit models to look for conflicts, but
these directions are beyond the scope of this paper.
Although the difficulty with existential negation and disjunction might seem to be a se-
rious weakness, there is strong evidence that humans suffer from very similar weaknesses.
For example, Johnson-Laird has amassed evidence that humans make numerous systematic
errors in dealing with existential logic that are neatly predicted by a theory of mental mod-
els according to which humans generate specific representations of situations and reason
with these explicit models even in cases where they know the models are overly specific
[32]. Similar constraints on mental representations of machines may lead to a better “meet-
ing of the minds” since systems that conceive of their environment in similar ways can talk
about them in similar ways. From a computational perspective, I believe my approach is
closely related to Levesque’s idea of “vivid representations”, which have difficulty deal-
ing with certain classes of existential negation and disjunction for similar reasons [38].
Levesque has argued that the choice of vivid representations is defendable when practical
concerns of computational tractability are taken into account.
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5.5. Event schemas
Events are partial changes in situations. In Fig. 14, an indexical anchor for time binds
groups of spatial analog beliefs from two situations at two different points in time (indi-
cated by the two large rectangular frames). Temporal analog beliefs (T 1 and T 2) encode
regions along a one-dimensional local timeline exactly analogous to the two-dimensional
spatial domain for spatial indexicals in Ripley. A temporal categorizer temporalCat
projects the categorical belief after(T 2, T 1), specifying that the situation on the right fol-
lows in time.
In the initial situation at T 1, a ball is believed to be contained in a cup, which is con-
tained in the default spatial domain. At some later time T 2, the containment relation
between the ball and cup becomes invalid—the agent places zero belief in the outcome
contain(L1,L2). Only changes from T 1 are indicated in the situation for T 2—all other
aspects of the original situation are assumed unchanged. Like actions, events may be rep-
resented at higher levels of abstraction to suppress “by means of” details, retaining only
higher level representations about changes of state. At one level the particular trajectory
of the motion of a cup might be specified, at a higher level only the before-after change in
position and orientation.
6. Intentional signs
The representational foundations are finally in place to address the motivation behind
this entire theoretical construction: grounding language. Recall that there are three classes
of signs. We have covered natural and indexical signs. The final class of signs, intentional
signs, are used by agents for goal-driven communication.
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Speech acts are the canonical intentional sign. Viewed from a Gricean perspective [26],
speech acts are chosen by rational agents in pursuit of goals. I say “the coffee is cold” to
convince you of that fact, and by Gricean implicature, to issue a directive to you to bring
me hot coffee. Intentional signs are emitted by an agent into the environment. Like all
signs, intentional signs are physical patterns that stand for something to someone. In the
case of intentional signs, as opposed to natural and indexical signs, the link from sign to
signified is established by conventions agreed upon by a community of intentional sign
users. Gestures such as pointing may also constitute intentional signs but are not addressed
here.
Speech acts are assembled from lexical units (words and other elements of the lexicon)
using a grammar. Since my focus will be on primitive descriptive and directive speech acts,
sophisticated grammars are not needed, only basic rules that map serial order to and from
thematic role assignments. For this reason I will not say much more about parsing and
grammar construction here11 but instead simply assume the requisite primitive grammar is
available to the agent.
6.1. Lexical units (words)
Fig. 15 shows the internal representational structure of a word. A fifth type of projection
is introduced in this figure, an intentional projection. This projection is an indicator to the
agent that the sign projected by it, in this case the categorical belief labeled “cup”, is a
conventional projection, i.e., one that can only be interpreted in the context of communica-
tive acts. Intentional projections block interpretative processes used for natural signs since
hearing “cup” is not the same as seeing a cup. Hearing the surface form of the word that
denotes cups will be interpreted differently depending on the speech act within which it is
embedded in (consider “there is a cup here” versus “where is my cup?”).
The domain of LEX in Fig. 15 is the discrete set of all lexical units known to the agent.
The agent using the schema in Fig. 15 is able to convert discrete lexical units into sur-
face forms in order to emit them into the environment through speak actions, hopefully in
earshot of other agents attuned to speech through senseSpeech or functionally equivalent
sensor projections. The speechCat categorizer has been implemented in our systems using
standard statistical methods of continuous speech recognition using hidden Markov mod-
els. To invert the process, a sixth and final type of projection is introduced. SpeechGen is a
11 Elsewhere, we have explored the relationship between grammar acquisition and visual context [60,61] and
the interaction of visual context on parsing of text [25] and speech [65].
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Since the mapping from analog to categorical signs is one-to-many, the inversion of this
process leaves room for variation. If categories are formed on the basis of thresholds on, or
competition between prototypes, then prototypes are natural choices as outputs of generator
projections. In previous work on visual-context guided word acquisition, we implemented
word structures that are consistent with the schema in Fig. 15 in which speechGen and
speechCat shared acoustic prototypes of word surface forms [60].
Word schemas can be connected to various schemas within an agent’s store of schema
types. I have made suggestions of ways by which schemas provide grounding for several
classes of lexical units. We have seen examples of schemas for properties including visual
property names (“red”, “round”), affordance terms (“soft”, “heavy”), spatial and temporal
relation labels (“touching”, “before”), verbs (“lift”, “move”), and nouns (“cup”, “thing”).
In addition, the very notion of an individual arises from the act of instantiating and main-
taining particular schemas, providing the basis for proper nouns and binding of indexical
terms (“that cup”, or more persistent proper names).
6.2. Using speech acts
As a basic classification scheme for communicative acts, Millikan has suggested the dis-
tinction between descriptive and directive acts [42]. Descriptives are assertions about the
state of the world and are thus akin to natural signs (assuming the speaker can be trusted).
Directives are fundamentally different—they are requests for action (including questions,
which are requests for information). A speech act may be both descriptive and directive.
In the situation depicted in Fig. 2, “This coffee is cold” is a descriptive (it describes the
temperature of a particular volume of liquid) and perhaps also a directive (it may imply
a request for hot coffee). In systems we have constructed to date, only the more literal
interpretation of speech acts have been addressed, thus I will limit the following discus-
sion to this simplest case. I first discuss how the framework handles directives, and then
descriptives.
Directives are understood by agents by translating words into goals. The agent’s plan-
ning mechanisms must then select actions to pursue those goals in context-appropriate
ways. This approach suggests a control-theoretic view of language understanding. If we
view a goal-directed agent as a homeostasis seeking organism, directive speech acts are
translated by the agent into partial shifts in goal states which effectively perturb the or-
ganisms out of homeostasis. This perturbation causes the agent to act in order to regain
homeostasis.
In our schema notation, a goal is represented using a dashed outline for the appropriate
analog or categorical distribution which the agent must satisfy in order to satisfy the goal.
These may be called analog goals or categorical goals. A transition ending in a spreading
set of three rays (an iconic reminder that goals are reached for) connects the analog belief as
it is currently believed to be to the desired target value. In Fig. 16, the agent has set the goal
of changing the cup’s location such that the containment relation holds. This corresponds
to the directive, “Put the cup on the plate”.
Ripley understands limited forms of directives such as, “touch the bean bag on the left”,
or, “pick up the blue one”. To perform the mapping from speech acts to goals, the output of
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a small vocabulary speech recognizer is processed by a parser [25] which is integrated with
Ripley’s control system and mental model architecture [64]. In some cases, a directive will
lead Ripley to collect additional information about its environment before pursuing the goal
set by the directive. For example, if the robot is directed to “hand me the heavy one”, but
the weights of the objects in view are unknown, Ripley’s planning system uses the implicit
control structure of the schema underlying “heavy”12 to lift and weigh each candidate
object to determine which best fits the bill. Details of Ripley’s planning algorithms are
forthcoming. There are of course many other kinds of directives, but in essence, I believe
treating the comprehension of directives as a problem of translation into goal schemas is a
productive path forward (for another implementation along these lines see [33]).
A higher order verbal behavior, one that we have not yet explored, is the generation of
directive speech acts. To produce goal-directed directives in a principled way, the agent
must be able to plan with the use of instruments, and treat communication partners as
instruments who can be controlled by influencing their goals through speech acts. This
in turn requires that the speaker have some degree of “theory of other minds” in order to
reason about the goals and plans of other agents. This asymmetry between the cognitive
requirements of language understanding and language generation might in part explain
why language comprehension always leads production in child language development.
Understanding descriptive speech acts is treated in a similar vein as interpreting natural
signs since both provide information about the state of the world. An interesting challenge
in understanding descriptive acts is the problem of under-specification in linguistic descrip-
tions. “The cup is on the table” tells us nothing about the color, size, orientation, or precise
location of the cup. Looking at a cup on the table seems to provide all of this information at
first sight, although change blindness experiments demonstrate that even short term mem-
ory encoding is highly goal-dependent (I might recall meeting someone yesterday and the
topic of our conversation, but not the color of her shirt). The framework allows for vari-
ous forms of descriptive under-specification. For example, to express uncertainty of spatial
location, belief can be spread with high entropy across the domain of an indexical analog
belief.
Generation of descriptive speech acts, like generation of directives, also requires some
ability to maintain theories of other minds in order to anticipate effective word choices for
communicating descriptions. The Describer system [61] uses an anticipation strategy to
weed out descriptions of objects which the system predicts will be found ambiguous by
12 The words “heavy” and “light” are grounded in active perception schemas similar to those for “soft” and
“hard” shown in Fig. 10. Accumulation of joint forces during lifting project the weight of objects.
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modeled.
There are numerous ideas which we could explore at this point ranging from context-
dependency of word meanings (categorizers may receive bias shift signals from other
categorizers, for example, to differentiate heavy feathers from light elephants) to the def-
inition of connotative meanings for an agent (as long term summary statistics of objects,
properties, and actions in their likelihood to assist or block goals—heavy objects probably
block more goals of a low powered manipulator whose goal is to move things around, so
the robot would develop a negative connotation towards the concept underlying “heavy”).
Given our lack of specific implementations to flesh out such ideas, however, I will not
attempt to elaborate further.
7. Taking stock
A summary of the elements of the theory provides a complete view of the framework
developed thus far:
(1) Three classes of signs, natural, indexical, and intentional, carry different kinds of
information for agents.
(2) Agents hold beliefs about analog signs (analog beliefs), and beliefs about discrete
categories (categorical beliefs).
(3) Six types of projections (sensors, actions, transformers, categorizers, intentional pro-
jections, and generators) link beliefs to form schemas. Sensor and action projections
are transducers that link schemas to physical environments.
(4) Schemas may use parameters to control actions.
(5) Objects are represented by networks of interdependent schemas that encode proper-
ties and affordances. Object schemas subsume property and action schemas.
(6) Using schemas, an agent is able to interpret, verify, and guide actions towards objects,
object properties, spatiotemporal relations, situations, and events.
(7) Lexical units are pairs of analog beliefs (encoding surface word forms) and categor-
ical beliefs (encoding lexical unit identity) connected to defining schemas through
intentional projections.
(8) Speech acts are intentional signs constructed from lexical units.
(9) Two kinds of intentional signs, descriptive and directive, are used to communicate.
(10) Directive speech acts are interpreted into goal schemas that an agent may choose to
pursue.
(11) Descriptive speech acts are interpreted into existential beliefs represented through
schemas which are compatible with (and thus may be verified and modified by) sens-
ing and action.
In my introductory remarks I highlighted the referential-functional duality of linguistic
meaning. I defined grounding to be a process of predictive-causal interaction with the
physical environment. Finally, I proposed three requirements for any theory of language
grounding. Let us briefly review how the theory addresses these points.
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about entities and situations in the world. Words project to schemas which are constructed
out of beliefs about signs, and signs are about the world due to causal physical laws. The
choice of a word’s surface form is arbitrary and conventional, but the underlying mapping
of its categorical belief is shaped by causal-predictive interactions with the environment.
Language use is situated via indexical beliefs constructed in the process of using language.
(2) Agents use language to pursue goals. Since all schemas may serve as guides for con-
trolling action, and words are defined through schemas, the very representational fabric of
word meanings may always be viewed from a functional perspective.
Schemas are networks of beliefs. Beliefs are both memories of what has transpired,
and also predictions of what will transpire (contingent on action). This dual use of belief
structures satisfies the predictive-causal definition of the grounding process provided in
Section 2.
Finally, we may assess the framework with respect to the three requirements proposed
in Section 3:
(1) Unification of representational primitives: Objects, properties, events, and higher level
structures are all constructed from a unified set of analog beliefs, categorical beliefs,
and six types of projections.
(2) Cross-modal translatability: Natural signs, indexical signs, and intentional speech acts
are interpreted into schemas. Directive speech acts are interpreted as goal schemas.
Descriptive speech acts (which are often vague when compared to perceptually de-
rived descriptions) are interpreted into compatible schematized belief structures. In
other words, speech acts (intentional signs) are translated into the same representa-
tional primitives as natural and indexical signs.
(3) Integrated space of actions: Although not explored in this paper, the framework lends
itself to decision theoretic planning in which the costs and expected payoffs of speech
acts and motor acts may be fluidly interleaved during goal pursuit.
8. Social belief networks
In Section 2 I gave a relatively stringent definition of grounding that requires the be-
liever to have direct causal-predictive interaction with the physical subjects of its beliefs.
The theoretical framework I have developed does just this—it provides structured repre-
sentations of various concepts underlying words and speech acts that are grounded strictly
in sensory-motor primitives. But of course most of what we know does not come from first
hand experience—we learn by reading, being told, asking questions, and in other ways
learning through intentional signs. I argued that to make use of symbolically described
information, an agent needs an independent path to verify, acquire, and modify beliefs
without intermediaries. Building on this, social networks may collectively ground knowl-
edge that not all members of community can ground. I depict such networks of belief
amongst agents in Fig. 17. Everything we have discussed thus far may be denoted by the
graph on the left. It shows a single agent that holds the belief B(x) about the world. The
world (denoted as the rectangle with a electrical ground sign at bottom) indeed contains x
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and causally gives rise to B(x) as indicated by the upwards arrow. The downward arrow
from the agent back to the world denotes that the agent has the ability to verify B(x) by
interacting directly with the physical environment.
The right panel of Fig. 17 shows a community of four agents. Only Agent 1 has full
and direct grounded beliefs in x. Agent 2 came to know about x through intentional signs
transmitted from Agent 1. Agent 2’s only way to verify x is to ask Agent 3. Agent 3 also
learned of x from Agent 1, but is able to verify by asking either Agent 1 or Agent 4. This
kind of graph is reminiscent of Putnam’s linguistic division of labor [54] in which an expert
about x (Agent 1) grounds beliefs about x on behalf of others in the belief network. The
claim I began with is that there exists some basic set of concepts about the world we all
share which each agent must ground directly for itself, and that language uses these shared
concepts to bootstrap mediated networks such as the right side of Fig. 17. The ubiquitous
use of physical metaphor in practically all domains of discourse across all world languages
[36] is a strong indication that we do in fact rely on physical grounding to as the basis of
conceptual alignment underlying symbolic communication.
9. Related ideas
The theory I have presented brings together insights from semiotics (the study of signs)
dating back to Peirce with schema theory dating back to Kant. There is a great deal of prior
work on which the theory rests. Rather than attempt a comprehensive survey, I highlight
selected work that is most closely related and that I have not already mentioned elsewhere
in the paper.
Perhaps the most well known early work in this area is the SHRDLU system constructed
by Winograd [76]. This work demonstrated the power of tight integration of language
processing within a planning framework. A key difference in Winograd’s work was the
assumption that the language user has a complete, symbolically described world model
(blocks on a table top in the case of SHRDLU). The issue of word-to-physical-world con-
nectedness was not a concern in Winograd’s work. As a result, his approach does not lead in
any obvious way to the construction of physically grounded language systems. Categoriza-
tion is not addressed in SHRDLU whereas a central aspect of the approach I have described
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resulting distinction between analog and categorical beliefs. Many of Winograd’s insights
on the interaction of planning, dialog, and reference, however, remain highly relevant for
the theory I have presented here, and indeed complement the issues I have addressed. Over
a decade after SHRDLU, Winograd and Flores [77] wrote a critique of symbolic AI in-
cluding the methods employed by SHRDLU. The gist of this critique is to point out the
interpretive “sleight of hand” that tends to underlie symbolic AI systems such as SHRDLU,
and the ascriptive errors AI practitioners made in using terms such as “understanding” to
describe such systems (see also [53]). A key reason for this ascription error was that the
systems were unable to link symbols to their physical environment without a human in the
loop. In contrast, grounded language systems address this limitation.
Minsky’s conception of frames [43] is similar in spirit to my approach. Frames are data
structures that represent stereotyped situations, and are instantiated to interpret experienced
situations much as I have suggested the role of schemas here. Minsky suggests frames as a
structure for interpretation, verification, and control as I have for schemas. Minsky’s paper
covered a far wider range of domains, and thus naturally provided less specific details on
any one domain. In contrast, the theory I have outlined is focused specifically on questions
of language grounding and reflects specific structures that arose from a concerted effort to
build language processing systems.
Schank and Abelson [68] developed a theory of scripts which are organizing knowledge
structures used to interpret the meaning of sentences. Scripts are highly structured repre-
sentations of stereotyped situations such as the typical steps involved in eating a meal at a
restaurant. Scripts are constructed from a closed set of 11 action primitives but an open set
of state elements. For example, to represent the stereotyped activities in a restaurant script,
representational state primitives include hungry, menu, and where-to-sit. In contrast, I have
suggested a theory which avoids open sets of symbolic primitives in favor of a closed set
of embodiment-dependent primitives.
Several strands of work by cognitive scientists and linguists bear directly on the topics I
have discussed. Bates and Nelson have proposed constructivist analyses of early language
development [9,46]. The computational framework presented here is compatible with both
of their approaches. Miller and Johnson-Laird compiled perhaps the most comprehensive
survey to date of relationships between language and perception [41]. Barsalou’s percep-
tual symbol system proposal [7] stresses the importance of binding symbols to sensory-
motor representations, as evidenced by recent experiments that probe the embodied nature
of cognitive processes [24,73]. Barsalou’s proposal emerged from human behavioral exper-
iments as opposed to construction of systems, and as a result provides a more descriptive
account in contrast to the computational level of explanation I have attempted here. Jack-
endoff [31] presents a compelling view on many aspects of language that have influenced
my approach, particularly his ideas on “pushing the world into the mind”, i.e., treating
semantics from a subjective perspective.
Some noteworthy approaches in the robotics community are closely related to the use
of schemas I have proposed. Kuipers’ Semantic Spatial Hierarchy suggests a rich multi-
layered representation for spatial navigation [35]. This representation provides a basis for
causal-predictive grounding in spatial domains which I believe might be of great value for
grounding spatial language. Grupen’s work on modeling affordances [13] intermingles ob-
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perspective.
Bailey [5] and Narayanan [44] propose the use of modified forms of Petri nets (a formal-
ism used to model concurrent, asynchronous control flow in networks) to model schema-
like structures underlying natural language verbs. Bailey’s representation of manipulation
actions is similar to ours (Bailey’s implementations were based on a simulated robot arm).
Narayanan used modified Petri nets as a basis for understanding abstract economic news
stories by analogy to underlying physical action metaphors (e.g., “the economy hit rock
bottom”). Siskind [70] proposed an approach to modeling perceptually grounded repre-
sentations underlying manipulation verbs by combining force dynamics primitives with
Allen’s temporal relations [1]. The representation of events proposed by Bailey, Narayanan,
and Siskind are all able to model more complex event structures than the approach I have
presented here based on sequences of situation schema. However, my approach provides
a holistic account for actions and other ontological categories such as objects, properties,
and spatial relations, whereas these other approaches focus only on event structure. An in-
teresting direction would be to investigate ways to incorporate the more expressive power
of Petri nets or Siskind’s representation to augment the schema structure while retaining
the holistic nature of the framework I have presented.
Littman, Sutton and Singh [39] have proposed the idea of predictive representations of
state through which states of a dynamical system are represented as “action conditional
predictions of future observations”. The exact relationship between those ideas and the
ones I have presented will require detailed study, but it seems to be very similar in spirit if
not formulation. Also closely related is Cohen’s work with robots that learn “projections
as concepts” [14] which have been linked to linguistic labels leading to a limited form of
language grounding [15].
10. Meaning machines
There are many important questions that this framework raises that I have not begun
to address. Where do schemas made of analog beliefs, categorical beliefs, and projections
come from? How and to what extent can their structure and parameters be learned through
experience? How might hierarchical structures be used to organize and relate schemas?
What kind of cognitive architecture is needed to maintain distinct schematic beliefs and
desires? How does an agent perform efficient inference and planning with them? How are
abstract semantic domains handled? How are higher level event, action, and goal structures
organized to support more sophisticated forms of inference and social interaction? These
are of course challenging and deep questions that point to the immense number of future
directions suggested by this work.
The framework introduced in this paper emerged from the construction of numerous
grounded language systems that straddle the boundary of symbolic and non-symbolic
realms. In contrast to models that represent word meaning with definitions made of word-
like symbols, I have taken a semiotic perspective with the intent of unifying language,
perception, and action with a small number of representational primitives. Systems imple-
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inner “mental world” of beliefs that are structured to support linguistic communication.
Although most language in adult conversation does not refer to the concrete physical
world, is motivated my focus on concrete semantics by two main observations about hu-
man communication. First, children bootstrap language acquisition by conversing about
their immediate environment—human semantics is physically anchored. Second, a shared
external reality, revealed to agents through physical patterns, is the only way to explain
why conceptual systems are aligned across agents to any degree at all, and thus why we
can communicate with one another. If we are going to bring machines into our conceptual
and conversational world as autonomous agents that understand the meaning of words for
and by themselves—that truly mean what they say—grounding will play a central role.
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